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Culture, Media and Sport Committee - The 
Gambling Act 2005: A bet worth taking? 
Written evidence submitted by Professor Linda 
Hancock 
This submission is sent as an individual academic international 
expert on gambling research. Prof Hancock is employed by 
Deakin University Australia, but has had considerable insight into 
gambling regulation, research and treatment in the UK. This 
includes engagement as international consultant to DCMS to 
review the Bookmakers’ Association (Europe Economics) report 
on FOBTs; appointment as consultant interim Head of Research 
to the RIGT (Responsibility in Gambling Trust) in 2007–10 
including overseeing the conduct of the RIGT/ESRC research 
partnership; risk and protection framework and on-going 
oversight of PhD program. 
In addition to peer review for key gambling research 
international journals and monograph publishers, Prof. Hancock 
has had considerable international experience in gambling policy 
and evaluation, regulation and research; having been engaged as 
an international referee by research funders, government 
regulators and policy advice departments in Canadian provinces 
of British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Nova Scotia in Canada; 
New Zealand research funding organisations; UK ESRC research 
application assessor; Australian Research Council grants 
assessor, and with numerous publications including Regulatory 
Failure? The Case of Crown Casino, Australian Scholarly 
Publishing, North Melbourne, 2011. 
1. How effective the Act has been in its core objectives 
to: 
ensure that gambling is maintained crime-free and conducted 
in an open and fair manner; 
protect children and vulnerable people from the adverse 
effects of gambling; 
update the legislative framework with regards to online 
gambling 
1.1 At the outset, it should be noted that under the watch of the 
2005 Gambling Act, there is robust evidence of increasing harms 
caused by gambling. The increase in problem gambling from 
0.6% (prior to the implementation of the Act) to 0.9% of the 
British population reported in the British Gambling Prevalence 
Survey (BGPS) (2010) is significant at the .05 level; which is 
internationally recognised as a robust significance level. This 
represents a 50% rise in problem gambling since the Act was 
implemented. It was disingenuous of the Gambling Commission 
to report the results as “not statistically relevant” and “at the 
margins of statistical relevance” in its media release concerning 
the study. This equates to around 451,000 adults aged 16 and 
over experiencing serious gambling-related problems and 
significant additional numbers experiencing moderate problems. 
Regular (approximately monthly) use of gaming machines, fixed 
odds betting terminals (FOBTs) in betting shops, casino games 
and online gambling are associated with problem gambling. 
Clearly this result is a wake-up call that more needs to be done 
to address problem gambling in Britain, prevent people becoming 
problem gamblers and to address the vulnerability of some 
groups which are particularly at risk of harm. The BGPS results 
signal groups who are vulnerable to gambling-related harms and 
the need for a public health preventative approach. 
1.2 It is unknown the extent to which gambling regulation is 
successful in the maintenance of crime-free gambling. In order to 
use gambling machines to launder money (for example on bingo 
hall machines, casino machines or FOBTS) players simply feed in 
money via note acceptors into gaming machines, play for a short 
amount of time and then cash out all funds on the pretence they 
constitute winnings. Crime-free gambling would be enhanced by 
more proactive regulation and transparency on money laundering 
prevention. This could be facilitated by the introduction of smart 
cards and player tracking (smart cards are currently under 
review following a trial in Nova Scotia and proposed for 
implementation in Australia). Card-based play is a deterrent to 
use of machines for money laundering, as individual gamblers 
are identified with problematic patterns of play and cash-out. At 
the very least, gambling machine pay-out slips that differentiate 
money paid in, from gambling winnings, would deter money 
laundering; which is currently easy on readily-accessible gaming 
machines that are fitted with note acceptors at venues all over 
Britain. 
It was recognised by the Financial Action Task Force/Groupe 
d’Action Financière (2009) Third Mutual Evaluation Report on 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism, that adequate training and supervision is needed to 
regulate money laundering. Money laundering related to 
crime/drugs has been associated with betting shop activities in 
some areas. In London, the Haringey Scrutiny Review (2010) 
stated: “Haringey’s own Enforcement Team recently engaged in 
activity to tackle protection rackets, illegal gambling and money 
laundering centred on social clubs and other premises”. 
The 2005 Act gave regulators new powers and new duties to 
keep gambling crime-free. What is concerning is the lack of 
transparency from the Regulator and lack of publication of 
standard data on premises, number of machines and net gaming 
revenue that are collected for licensed premises. Such data 
would enable money laundering alerts and assist local 
communities in prevention activities. 
1.3 With regard to the protection of minors, the Gambling Act is 
inconsistent in its approach to the need to protect minors from 
the harms of gambling. Britain is one of the few jurisdictions in 
the world to allow youth aged 16–18 to participate in some forms 
of gambling. By trying to allow historical participation of youth in 
playing what were in the past, regarded as benign fruit machines 
for example, now exposes them to new products which are in 
many respects similar to products restricted to adults because of 
their potentially addictive features. Liberalising some forms of 
gambling for youth aged 16-18 was premised on the assumption, 
as expressed by the Secretary of State Tessa Jowell: “we do 
have to address the risks that children face, but not by taking 
disproportionate action in respect of matters for which there is no 
evidence of harm”. Now there is evidence of harm, this stance is 
no longer appropriate and allowing children to gamble sends the 
wrong message. 
1.4 The Ipsos Mori (2009) Omnibus survey has found consistent 
trends of higher rates of problem gambling among children than 
those found for adults. This element of the Act needs urgent 
review since youth are vulnerable with regard to their age/stage 
of development, their propensity to peer pressure and their 
immaturity. An age of 18 would bring Britain in line with the 
protection afforded youth in other jurisdictions. 
Local government planning powers need to be 
restored 
1.5 Related to the legislative objective to protect minors and 
other vulnerable groups, is the incapacity of Local Authorities 
under the Act, to reject licensing applications for betting shops 
on the grounds of density or saturation. In areas high on the 
Deprivation Index such as Hackney, the high density of betting 
shops renders the community vulnerable to exposure to 
gambling. 
As Hackney LA (2009) at its Community Safety and Social 
Inclusion Scrutiny Committee observes: 
Hackney has 64 betting shops which is three times the national 
average for a local authority area. At the same time the borough 
has areas of significant deprivation and a mapping of the location 
of these shops reveals that they cluster in the poorer areas of the 
borough … 
In 2007 a campaign by residents and ward councillors attracted a 
petition of 400 residents against the planning consent for the 
opening of a third betting shop on Chatsworth Road. That 
campaign failed at Appeal and at this time a deputation was also 
brought to Full Council urging it to press for a change in the 
planning laws. 
1.6 Whereas the previous regulatory framework enabled 
magistrates to take account of a “demand test”; this provision 
was removed under the 2005 Act and LAs are hamstrung in 
terms of protecting their communities from over-exposure to 
gambling and in planning the composition of their high street 
retail communities. 
Furthermore, the as-of-right entitlement of liquor licensed 
premises such as hotels and bingo premises to a minimum 
number of gambling machines (8 B machines and any number of 
C machines as approved, are allowed per bingo premise licensee) 
does not allow separate determination of the appropriateness of 
each separate activity at the nominated premises. 
2. The financial impact of the Act on the UK gambling 
industry 
2.1 The lack of transparent data on the composition, net (after 
prizes) earnings, location and intensity levels of UK gambling 
products and venues/operations, make it difficult to obtain 
objective data on the growth of the gambling industry in Britain 
following the implementation of the 2005 Gambling Act. One 
estimate is that “The UK’ betting and gaming industry has a 
substantial turnover and net expenditure on games of chance, 
including The National Lottery, increased by 19.6% in 2008 
compared with the previous year, which was by far the largest 
increase recorded over several years” (Research and Markets: An 
Essential Report on the Betting & Gaming Market DUBLIN. 
2.2 These figures substantiate a finding that the UK gambling 
industry has benefited financially from the liberalisation of 
gambling opportunities, for example, the expansion in the 
number of bookmakers shops (each entitled to fourTs, the total 
of which previously numbered approximately 20,00 but now 
number in excess of 30,000). The industry has also benefited, for 
example, from the growth of sports betting, contract for 
difference (regulated under the Financial Services Act), internet 
gambling and the number of gambling machines in venues such 
as bingo halls (with the as of right number of category B 
machines increased from four to eight) and alarmingly high 
numbers of C machines in such premises. The increases in 
category C machine stakes granted by the Gambling 
Commission, has also contributed to these increases in profits. 
The recommended doubling of the maximum bet on category B3 
machines from £1 to £2 is questionable, when a machine with its 
auto spin set at one game per second can result in a loss per 
hour of £3,600, which would double to £7,200 if the stake is 
allowed to be doubled. This puts gambling machines in Britain on 
a par with machines in countries such as Australia, previously 
assessed by the Budd Committee as a level of intensity of 
gambling to be avoided under the new 2005 Act. 
These potential losses on a category C (bingo hall) machine put 
UK machines way ahead of the Australian Productivity 
Commission recommendation of A$1 per button press “A limit of 
$1 would strongly target problem gamblers, with little 
disturbance for others” (PC, 2010, p 26). Where is the 
requirement for harms assessments prior to such changes or for 
the industry to provide scientific data that such increases in 
numbers and intensity of machines will not cause harm? With 
increasing access and availability of machine gambling, the 
stakes and potential maximum spend needs to be reduced down 
(as in Australia and Norway); not increased. 
2.3 The Gambling Act 2005 gives the Secretary of State the 
power to invoke a levy on the Industry. After a Gambling 
Commission public consultation where the industry lobbied hard 
to retain the levy as a voluntary contribution, the gambling 
industry has negotiated down its previous undertaking to 
contribute to research, prevention and treatment; and this has 
apparently been agreed. The costs associated with the industry 
charity (Great) set up to raise these funds from the industry, are 
considerable and represent an inefficient means of collecting the 
“polluter-pays” voluntary tax. On the New Zealand model, a 
compulsory 3% levy paid into an independent trust charged with 
independent commissioning of research, prevention and 
treatment, would cut costs considerably and would result in less 
interference of the industry in operational matters related to 
discharge of the funds and overall, would enhance independence, 
transparency, good governance and efficiency. 
2.4 On the other side of the ledger, the full costs of the 
unquantified but considerable harms (depression, bankruptcy, 
suicide, crime, job loss, family violence and financial hardship) 
caused by gambling are unknown as the relevant data is not 
collected by the relevant department (DCMS) or the Regulator. 
3. The effectiveness of the Gambling Commission (GC) 
since its establishment, and whether it represents 
good value for money 
3.1 The protection from harms was emphasised by the Secretary 
of State Tessa Jowell in the November 2004 Order for a Second 
Reading speech. The Commission’s performance on harm 
prevention and implementation of the objectives of the Act are a 
more pertinent standard than “value for money” in the area of 
gambling; an area which is conditionally legal and potentially 
very harmful. 
3.2 The Gambling Commission was hailed in August 2007 as a 
“tough new regulator” “with stringent powers that allow them to 
take decisive action against operators who fail to meet the high 
standards required by the Gambling Act” 
(www.whitehallpages.net/news/archive/31400). To a large 
extent, given the objectives of the Act, the GC’s performance is 
disappointing, as its decisions are most frequently in favour of 
the industry business case rather than an assessment of public 
interest. Some examples are: doubling the number of category B 
machines allowed in bingo halls in response to industry claims of 
lost revenue caused by the smoking ban; ignoring the industry 
flouting of the law with regard to “split premises” where 
operators gain twice the number of machines by splitting one 
licensed premise into two; or the GC’s decision to increase the 
intensity of gaming machines with an increase in the stake on 
both B and C machines - with no concomitant requirement for 
research evidence this will not cause harm. In such decisions, the 
GC consistently favours the gambling industry business case, and 
there is a dearth of evidence provided by any party, that such 
changes will not result in harm or intensify risks. 
Other concerns include: 
Lack of transparency: The GC does not routinely publish 
information from its licensing returns (deeming such 
material commercial in confidence). This could form a 
much-needed source of information about gambling venues 
and revenue, that should be available publicly in updated 
form; 
Lack of information about the location, machine type, 
number of machines/gaming tables/bingo seats etc, and 
net gambling revenue for venues, and industry sectors. 
Consequently the sort of geospatial data that is standard 
practice in jurisdictions like Australia, is lacking in Britain. 
Such data would be invaluable for informed policy making 
and would empower communities to know more about the 
impact of gambling on local economies. 
Lack of transparency in archiving of submissions. The GC 
summarises submissions to its enquiries, which means that 
public access is generally denied to actual submissions, the 
wording of claims and the nature and source of evidence 
proffered. Summaries frequently compare the weighting of 
responses, leading to a privileging of the views of the 
gambling industry, which has paid advocates to lobby the 
GC. In comparison the community and advocacy sector is 
poorly resourced and not in a position to counter industry 
self advocacy. The GC should be commissioning research 
evidence in carefully designed studies aimed at assessing 
pubic interest impacts; before it grants revenue-enhancing 
concessions to the industry. 
By international standards the Licensing Codes and 
Practices are deficient in public interest regulation; for 
example on Venue Problem Gambler Identification Policy; 
casino loyalty club based player tracking as a means of 
identifying problem gamblers. 
3.3 In terms of governance, the role of the GC lacks 
independence from the Strategy Board (set up as a committee 
reporting to the GC but with a secretariat provided from RGF, the 
independent charity charged with responsibility for 
commissioning research, prevention and treatment services). 
Under such a structure, the GC is too involved in operational 
matters. The Act needs to specify an alternative structure, which 
would ensure independent of government, regulation, research, 
prevention and a public health approach to protect consumers in 
a fast changing technologically driven product environment. 
4. The impact of the proliferation of off-shore online 
gambling operators on the UK gambling sector and the 
effect of the Act on this 
4.1 This submission is focused primarily on land-based gambling. 
However the increase in internet gambling is concerning 
alongside increases in internet-related problem gambling. There 
are appropriate programs now available for the Regulator to 
insist on provider interventions to prevent problem gambling and 
to better protect internet gambling consumers. Advertising on 
the internet has increase and is a concern; given childrens’ 
access to the internet and the lack of consumer protection of 
internet gambling regulation. The Act needs to be amended to 
ensure appropriate consumer protection for players on the 
internet along with a review of internet-related gambling harms. 
5. Why the Act has not resulted in any new licences 
for casinos or “super” casinos 
5.1 The Act has resulted in 16 new casinos and has not 
withdrawn the considerable number of casino licences retained 
under the Grandfathering clause. The controversy surrounding 
the super casino demonstrated how community sentiment was 
and still remains, essentially negative about gambling; as shown 
in the recent 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey. One 
reason for this is that whilst authorities procrastinate on putting 
in place the indicators and frameworks to “count the community 
costs” of gambling, it will be difficult to drive home to ministers 
and regulators how gambling-related harms impact on 
communities and families who essentially bear the costs of the 
expansion of gambling and its uninvited “normalisation” in 
everyday communities. The industry claim that gambling is 
entertainment, fails to acknowledge the dissimilarities between 
the risks of gambling and other leisure pursuits. 
6. The effectiveness of the classification and 
regulation of gaming machines under the Act 
6.1 The Gambling Act did not undertake a re-classification of 
gambling machines. This has resulted in a confusing array of 
machine classifications and sub-classifications which are 
constantly changing and which are confusing to consumers, 
operators and regulators. 
All machines are potentially dangerous to consumers, with 
additions like note acceptors, increased lines of play, increases in 
the minimum stake and fast (by international standards) spin 
rates. Gaming machines are designed to entice players to spend 
more money and time; which inevitably results in time spent 
being highly associated with diminishing returns to the player or 
consequent increasing losses. 
6.2 It is now internationally recognised that continuous platform 
gambling modes such as gaming machines are associated with 
significant risk and incidence of gambling-related harms. 
Figure 1 
(Productivity Commission, 2010) 
 
(Productivity Commission 2010) 
Figure 2 
(Productivity Commission, 2010) 
 
Source: Productivity Commission (2010) Gambling. Melbourne, 
Productivity Commission. No 50, 26 February 2010. Released 23 
June 2010. Available 
at: www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/gambling-2009/report 
6.3 The Australian Productivity Commission summarises this well 
by arguing that gaming machines are associated with greater 
problem gambling and with increased incidence of dissociation or 
loss of control. (See figures 1 and 2 below). Regular players 
(those playing monthly who comprise about 15% of players) are 
most at risk of problems and may also be seen as a “vulnerable 
group” with regard to risk of harm from gambling. The accepted 
figure is that about 40% of profits from gaming machines are 
derived from problem gamblers (Productivity Commission 2010). 
To counter the potential hams that may result, players need the 
offer of self-activated interventions like self exclusion or pre-
commitment (setting limits on time and or funds spent via card 
based play); or third party interventions such as limits on time or 
funds spent gambling (as for example, in Norway where a ceiling 
on possible amount spent per week results in players being cut 
off from access once the limit is reached.) 
7. What impact the Act has had on levels of problem 
gambling 
7.1 As cited above, under the watch of this Act, the measured 
rate of problem gambling has significantly increased and the 
impact on vulnerable groups such as youth, women, the mentally 
infirm and seniors. It is significant that the Gambling 
Commission’s 2010 industry revenue figures show a 7% increase 
in profit from machines for bingo clubs and gross profits of 2010 
industry figures published by Gambling Commission show a 7% 
increase in profit £87 million from B3 machines in Adult Gaming 
Centres. 
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